In each of the sectors of the urban economy a few large enterprises controlled by a wealthy family or handful of powerful businessmen effectively monopolized economic activity. Oscar Garretón analyzes the extent and process of concentration of economic power and the implications of this for such central questions as income redistribution, new forms of organization of economic life, and the direction of future development.
Now, large enterprises are passing from private to state control, but the shift in control does not mean that economic concentration will disappear in a decentralized socialism in which firms are in effect co-operatives under workers' control. Garretón argues that the state should keep large, technologically advanced enterprise intact and use its newly acquired economic power to engage in centrally planned development. Workers should be incorporated into decision making at the plant level in a process of socialization and democratization of economic life; but the state should have the final word in the economic decisions that affect the future of all Chileans. Full incorporation and participation of workers will be achieved under a state engaged in central planning that represents the interests of all workers as a class.
MONOPOLY IN CHILE AND THE PARTICIPATION OF WORKERS AND
THE STATE IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
From Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional, II, Nº. 7, March 1971. Oscar Guillermo Garretón
is Subsecretary of Economy in the Popular Unity government.
OSCAR GUILLERMO GARRETÓN
This exposition consists of three parts. The first is a descriptive analysis of capitalism in Chile. In the second part some implications of the monopolistic economic order are analyzed. In the third part we will observe other implications, such as the new forms of organization of the economic apparatus within a monopolistic economy. This exposition is related fundamentally to the present polemic concerning the proper way of incorporating the workers in management. This problem is analyzed in terms of the objective characteristics of the economic system.
The analysis presented here is not an attempt to reach a complete explanation. Only one part of the complex that forms the Chilean economic system is approached. Our attempt is to establish that the monopolistic character of the Chilean economy is so fundamental that an analysis centered on this aspect of reality has a truly transcendental result in the examination of the economic structure.
The descriptive analysis uses as its principal source a study made by the economist Jaime Cisternas and myself concerning Chilean corporations in 1966 and entitled Some Characteristics of the Decision-Making Process in Large Enterprises: The Dynamic of Concentration.
If we take the Chilean economy by sectors—the analysis concentrates mainly on the industrial sector—we find the following result: of the total of industrial corporations of the country, only 144 enterprises control more than 50 per cent of the assets in Chilean industry. Each of the branches of industry is thus controlled by a small number of firms. . . . This phenomenon is found in mining, commerce, transportation, service industries, and banking.
It is useful to examine what lies behind this number of 144 large enterprises, because the degree of concentration differs depending on whether the 144 belong to different owners or to the same owners. For example, taking as an indicator the capital held by the ten largest stockholders, among the 144 enterprises, we arrive at the following picture: In only one enterprise do the ten biggest stockholders own less than 10 per cent of the total capital in stock. In four enterprises the ten largest stockholders own between 10 and 20 per cent of the capital. In another four, ten own between 20 and 30 per cent of the capital; in five, between 30 and 40 per cent; in four, between 40 and 50 per cent; in eight, between 50 and 60 per cent; in thirteen, between 60 and 70 per cent; in nine, between 70 and 80 per cent; in fourteen, between 80 and 90 per cent; in seventy-seven, the ten largest stockholders own from 90 to 100 per cent of the capital of the enterprises. The figures were calculated on 140 enterprises for which information was available. This means that, from the start, in more than 50 per cent of the enterprises, the ten largest stockholders own between 90 and 100 per cent of the capital of the manufacturing industries. If we project this analysis to the totality of corporations—agricultural, mining, industrial, commercial, construction, etc.—the percentage of concentration is even higher.
Thus the large monopolistic enterprises do not have extensive ownership, and in some way the fiction of the thousands and thousands of stockholders connected to these enterprises is no more than an imaginary figure. Perhaps that number can exist, but the truth is that there are many thousands who are nothing more than fronts for the real stock controllers, while in each enterprise there are no more than five or ten persons who really control management decisions. . . . This permits us to point out that many large monopolistic enterprises have a family character. Not all, but many, of these began using the legal form of the corporation because of the tax advantages it represents, starting with the period of the Alessandri government,  which encouraged incorporation.
This reality also shows us that the stock market is marginal from the point of view of the operations performed in it. Its size impedes the carrying out of any important transaction through it. In fact, an important transaction implies such great variations in prices that the stock exchange becomes an inefficient mechanism for the Chilean capital market. Given such a great concentration of ownership, the possibility of controlling enterprises or of changing their ownership can be operational only through bilateral negotiation between owners and prospective buyers. Transactions are made in the stock market that may be important as complementary buying, but that in practice are actually marginal, since a large part of buying is controlled by only a few people, and the rest consist of small traders who in no way affect the policies of the large Chilean corporations.
A few enterprises have the power of orienting, controlling, and operating, with great room for manipulation, in each of the particular markets. ... It is possible also to distinguish certain monopolistic groups that extend their control in diverse enterprises of different subsectors of the industrial sector as well as in agriculture, mining (although to a lesser degree), commerce, services, transportation, and communications. This makes it difficult to speak of an industrial bourgeoisie, a commercial bourgeoisie, or a banking or financial bourgeoisie; in reality, it seems more accurate to speak of a large monopolistic bourgeoisie whose dominant centers invest in the most diverse sectors of the economy. This is important from the point of view of tactical action to construct a different society, because it presents us with means of judging the characteristics of the resistance that certain sectors could offer when faced with a transformation of the Chilean economic structure. Unfortunately, it is impossible here to use some of the charts that show the crossing of stock ownership in various enterprises and in different sectors and the relations of groups in different enterprises.
Intertwined within the textile sector, for example, we find that different important groups are related at the director level. Enterprises belonging to different owners have the same names repeated in their various directories. This demonstrates that beyond ownership concentration there is also regulated management by the economic groups over the dominant heights of the Chilean economy.
We will make a passing reference here to the banks, mostly with the intention of correcting common misconception. The banks appear to many as the center of economic power. They are identified as the centers from which Chilean monopoly power is managed. In our opinion, the truth is otherwise. The banks play a role fundamentally of providing cheap credit. Historically in Chile, the rate of inflation, together with fixed interest rates, has promoted negative real interest rates, and this has reverberated in a very high concentration of credit. Expressed in one set of data, from the Research Division of the Banco Central: in 1967, 2.7 per cent of the debtors, or 508 persons (both natural and legal), had credits of over one billion escudos; i.e., 2.7 per cent of the debtors command 58.1 per cent of the total credit. Furthermore, thirty-seven debtors, who represent 0.2 per cent of the private debtors, had individual credits in sums that reached 848 million escudos, or 23 per cent of the total credit. It is possible to show that this process increased over time. In fact, between the years 1965 and 1969 bank credit suffered a process of concentration that has worsened since the coming to power of the popular government. The most forcible proof of this is in the increasingly stronger and sharper pressures on the State Bank by the medium and small enterprises that previously had credit in the banking enterprises of which they were traditional clients. . . .
If we backtrack a bit to what we pointed out before, concerning the real rate of interest and the concentration of credit, it is worth while to make a short argument. If the banks themselves were heads of economic groups, their logical strategy would be to loan money to the bankers. In that way, and with a low rate of interest, the banks could consolidate their power over other economic activities. But it is clear that banks have not adopted that criterion. They have influence, they have stocks and bonds, but they do not play as impressive a role as controller. This demonstrates that they are not working for themselves, they are not taking advantage of credit conditions, but rather have absorbed these negative interest rates for a long time in order to transform themselves into cheap sources of credit for sectors that do take advantage of these conditions. It is possible to observe this by consulting bank directories. They do not form a unit in themselves, but, rather, distinct economic groups that converge toward banking activity to obtain the credit situation we have observed.
The major exception to this consideration is the Banco de Chile, which transforms its circulating assets into fixed assets by buying stocks. This policy has developed over time, and is more than a coincidence. It is due to the fact that this is the bank in which the banking bureaucracy or its high executive levels have an important role to play in credit policy: an autonomous policy distinct from that of the directors of other banks. The present president of the board of directors is a person who arose out of a banking career. This implies an important degree of power in what we have called in sociological terms the banking bureaucracy.
These considerations concerning banks suggest that if banks are not at the center of the most important economic groups, they do represent a source of vital support for economic power.  Another entity that should be mentioned is insurance. Traditionally there has also been confusion about the role of insurance within economic groups. It seems to us that, like the banks, it plays a subordinate role, because its principal function is not that of obtaining large profits within its own activity (in fact, its profits are notably low) but rather one of utilizing the reserves of insurance as a complementary means for control in other activities. . . . Insurance companies normally invest their reserves in enterprises linked to their economic groups. It is rare, however, to find any enterprise in which a certain insurance company or trust alone exercises an extraordinarily strong control.
Another facet of the operation of economic groups is the form in which they exercise their power in different controlled enterprises. And here we should make a distinction in time dating from roughly around the years 1965 and 1966. Until then and as the normal manner of operation of the groups, a type of control was used for the different enterprises that did not reflect a common coordinating center of great influence. That is to say, each group was present in the control of the different enterprises, but a central management did not exist. With a certain degree of autonomy, each activity was geared toward maximum profits (with exceptions, as noted, in banking and insurance). In this way, the group incorporated itself in the management of maximizing profit in each economic unit, but it did not exercise a very high degree of socialization in management. In practice, the decisions acted upon by the center of the economic group fundamentally concerned investment of the surplus, transferred to the group in the form of dividends. There was practically no permanent global decision concerning the totality of the investment of each economic group in itself. Starting in 1966, however, the situation changed radically, impelled by a new group, which incorporated itself in the national economy and which is known as the Banco Hipotecario or, as it is intimately known in economic circles, the Pirañas.  Its principal virtue, which has altered the forms of management since 1966, has consisted precisely in developing a form of socialized, centralized management for all its investments. In that sense, the group operates as a planning center, a center of socialization of investment decisions, or a market of capital within its own structure. How does this operate? Basically, the center of the group is not the enterprise in particular, but rather the group itself. In fact, its head is the Banco Hipotecario—at least until now. Thus the decisions made by the executives of the various enterprises, or by the directors who represent them in other enterprises, do not remain subject to the maximization of profits or to problems limited to any of those enterprises in particular; rather, the particular criteria are subordinated to the centrally planned criteria these groups utilize. Perhaps the Banco Hipotecario group's most important characteristic is its tactical capacity to take advantage of all the inefficiencies of the Chilean economy in its capital markets, with the aim of increasing its power. We mention in passing the fact that this group started with minimum financial means. Its advantage with respect to other financial groups was its high technical capability to analyze and operate within the Chilean capital markets. This technical feature of the Banco Hipotecario group is currently unrecognized and merits more importance. What conforms more to its legend is its speculative capacity and its ability to control rapidly and in varied forms the different activities of the country. Personally, I believe that this is not its most important feature but rather its most noticeable one. . . . 
The Banco Hipotecario group brought a new technique to the management of Chilean capital: the portfolio of investments. This technique originated in the United States as a means for the development of the conglomerates, which make their investments to promote not vertical integration but rather integration in which they hold at the same time, for example, industries such as coal, hotels, metals, chemicals, etc. . . .
Here, in Chile, this "portfolio" technique finds a convenient milieu for its development in the conditions of the capital market. Portfolio is a technique that permits the combination of yield and risk of different stocks in order to adjust the yield of a package of securities with a certain statistically calculated risk. This form of centralized management gave the Pirañas group great power. . . . The more socialized and centralized form of management was extended by means of a demonstration effect on the rest of the economic groups. Other groups within the Chilean economy began to utilize a more centralized management of investments. This case is valid for the Matte group, the Edwards group, and for groups such as Ferias La Rural, etc. All these began to formulate a unified management in which permanent discussion focused not on segments of the surplus but rather on the totality of the economic capacity of the group. Thus enterprises could be sold, investments settled, enterprises bought, etc., with great flexibility and taking full advantage of operating conditions.
What has happened to these groups since the election of Allende? Clearly it can be shown, after this date, that the Banco Hipotecario group has suffered an extraordinarily hard blow and that its strategy of centralized control in the large enterprises has deteriorated enormously. This has been reflected in the difficult situation of the Banco Hipotecario and has culminated in the "intervention" of this group. From my point of view, this situation is due to the fact that the triumph of the popular government has penetrated the milieu in which the Chilean monopolistic groups develop naturally. This alters their condition of operation and their whole form of development. Those most affected are the groups that operate technically, presupposing constants, assuming the institutional framework of the system. On changing the latter, reality becomes harshly transformed for them. The Banco Hipotecario group, for example, has had to confront a very high rise in risk for its operations. Part of this risk becomes transformed into uncertainty, into something incalculable; and in the measure in which the risk rises, in the measure in which uncertainty appears, there are necessarily repercussions concerning the liquidity of the group. The multiplier effect for each escudo they have is less. Risk necessarily requires liquidity in present conditions and therefore a real restriction on capacity of control. This forces them to abandon certain zones and confronts them with very great payment difficulties. This is the problem that the Banco Hipotecario group has to face now, a problem that confronts them in their mutual funds.
To a greater or lesser extent, this situation has had repercussions throughout all the monopolistic groups of the country, which obviously see themselves affected by the popular government in the measure in which they have recognized their condition of defeat. The campaign of the Popular Unity gave importance, in its economic strategy, to the attack on the forms of operation of the Chilean monopolistic groups, and the constitution of the road toward social property was transformed into a qualitatively important goal within the economic strategy. This evidently affects them in their functioning.
In summation, then, we can point out that Chile has an extraordinarily concentrated economy, in production as well as in ownership, which defines the characteristics of a strongly monopolistic economy. It will now be interesting to see, in the second part of this work, the implications of an economy with a strong monopolistic concentration for the functioning of some of its variables.
At the outset, it is impossible to think in terms of a policy of income redistribution while the monopolistic situation prevails in the form of a predominantly private economy. Every income redistribution policy will clash, in the last analysis, with this barrier in the path of its development. A highly concentrated economy with a capacity on the part of a small number of enterprises to manipulate the market means necessarily that the capacity to accumulate, the capacity to concentrate incomes in a regressive form, is a methodic and permanent reality of our economy. . . . The manipulation capacity of these enterprises in the market has as its consequence that any monetary policy becomes transformed into a greater quantity of resources, into a greater capacity for that sector to transfer its costs or directly to augment its profits. It is clear also that in some way the characteristics of production and consumption of our economy have their roots in this. Consumption is an objective reality that corresponds to the characteristics of income distribution. Any policy for popular consumption must consider this problem. It is difficult to envision producers responding to the demand of the popular sectors if there is an attractive and secure market in the high-income sectors, while the market in the lower-income sectors is less secure. The aggravating factor of the recent inflationary process means that slowly, throughout the year, the purchasing power of the popular sectors deteriorates little by little.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to redistribute income in a stable manner while the monopolistic sector of the economy is not managed in a planned way to function in the interests of the majority of the country. This will become possible only as the monopolistic sector passes into the hands of the state. We also confront problems in the accumulation of the monopolistic sector, which transforms our development into something contradictory. The industrial sector of greatest relative growth, technology, and capacity of accumulation is the monopolistic sector. This represents a certain contradiction from the point of view of our development. In the first place, that capacity of accumulation is concentrated so that the surplus is normally destined toward investments of high capital intensity, which generate low employment. This is reflected in Chilean economic activity by the incapacity of the industrial sector to absorb even the annual growth of the active population. This becomes transformed into a structural cause of unemployment. The problem is that if this development naturally continues, if we wish to promote it, we would find ourselves with the paradox that it could only be at the cost of provoking a major regression in the concentration of income, and it would not resolve the unemployment problem. . . .
Another point of interest is the problem of dependence on foreign capital. Foreign capital has extended its domain over practically all sectors and areas of national economic activity, and is especially influential within the monopolistic sector. Thus the role played by foreign capital in Chile is of enormous importance, because to control the monopolistic sector means, in reality, to control the workings of the Chilean economy. This problem also has qualitative importance even beyond its quantitative implications. Control by foreign capital means that our own development and growth are increasingly being determined outside the country. Investments are made by huge international conglomerates whose headquarters are not only outside Chile, but also outside Latin America. This necessarily has repercussions in a greater dependence in our decisions regarding the disposition of our surplus, the growth of our enterprises, and the development policy of the monopolistic sector. The policies for growth and production are being directed toward interests outside Chile and situated in the monopolistic center of power. This shrinking freedom to plan our economy is aggravated by the fact that, at present, Latin America does not have any means of controlling or expelling foreign capital. The question is, rather, who will grant foreign capital the greatest guarantees? For the national bourgeoisies, the presence of foreign capital is of vital importance. The bourgeoisies' level of dependence means that they do not have their own capacity or dynamism to face the present tasks for the development of Latin America. Only the state can provide that dynamism, under socialist forms of state capitalism, or foreign capital. Naturally, this last alternative is the most favorable for the monopolistic bourgeoisie. . . .
Monopoly is an inherent condition in the reality of our economy, and the problem is not one of how it can be made to disappear. Very probably monopoly is a reality we will have to deal with in the future, because to think in terms of dispersing the nuclei of production would be a Utopian socialistic formula. Thus the problem set forth at this moment is how to succeed in transforming a strongly monopolistic economy into an economy directed toward the benefit of the popular majorities.
We must consider how to plan the Chilean economy so that the dominant monopolistic sector operates in terms of a rational allocation of resources for the majority of the country. And here arises the discussion concerning the possible mechanisms of control. The mechanisms of indirect planning that constitute the traditional production forms in Chile have repeatedly demonstrated their inefficiency. . . . Indirect planning supposes control only over the periphery of decision making (subsidy decisions, tax decisions, commercialization and price decisions), all of which undoubtedly affect the behavior of businessmen. But in the measure in which that control exists, it motivates the businessman to take action. The businessman does not accept it passively, but rather reacts in a way to try to avoid it. That is the rationality of indirect control. . . .
If one really wants to plan economic activity, it is necessary not to control the periphery but rather to truly enter into the decision making of the centers of the national economy. We think that planning will really be effective only in so far as the state participates in the production decisions. . . .
Any form of planning will be feasible only if the monopolistic centers of power of the Chilean economy are in the hands of the state and, for that reason, depend on national planning.
Another point to be dealt with here refers to the monopolistic characteristics of the Chilean economy and the incorporation of the workers in the decision-making process. We ought here to make compatible the principle of centralized planning and the incorporation of the workers. We should make clear that incorporation of workers into decision making is synonymous not with decentralization, but rather with democratization and socialization of economic and state activity. The incorporation of the workers in an economy that socializes its most important monopolistic centers is not a sole criterion, nor should it assume the same form in all economic activities; rather, it must assume different forms in the distinct sectors. In the capitalist sectors there should be no incorporation of the workers in decision making, since there the workers do not have power and any incorporation would tend to play a more formal, or mitigating, role in the workers' struggle, which in the long run would weaken them. On the other hand, in the socialized sector the incorporation must be strong, so that the enterprises are not just state property but enterprises with a real socialized management.
In the private sector, neither the forms of stock property nor the formulas of comanagement are of use to the workers. The form of stock property does not alter the manner of legitimation of power in a capitalist enterprise, whereby one participates in power not because he is a worker but because he is a small owner of capital. Stock property fundamentally transforms the worker into a capitalist, provoking confusion and a tendency to weaken his power to make workers' demands within the enterprise. Comanagement is the same. Its postwar origin in all the capitalist countries in Europe at the initiative of the social Christian business sectors fundamentally had no other object than to dinunish and regulate the contradictions that surge up between businessmen and workers, with the ultimate goal of creating a kind of national consensus to resolve the problems of the reconstruction of these economies. In the measure in which reconstruction was a principal problem, certainly the formulas for co-management had relative success. They succeeded in mediating the conflicts and in attracting the workers' sectors. Once this moment was past, however, the mechanisms of comanagement began to lose much of this function, and the objective contradictions that had been covered up by the task of reconstruction appeared. It is thus that the contradiction of class interests objectively led to the ineffectiveness of the company committees. This has resulted in the present opposition to the operation of these committees by businessmen as well as workers in many European countries. The workers oppose them because they lead to a petty-bourgeois point of view among their representatives in the different committees and because they weaken them in their long-run struggles. The businessmen oppose them because in the measure in which their co-optive strategy fails, the committees or councils of comanagement become transformed into a stage at which the contradictory interests of management and workers come face to face.
This reality has had similar repercussions in Chile, and there have been cases in which the workers have had to resort to conflict in order to bring about the elimination of this type of comanagement. We believe that neither system benefits the workers. In a capitalist economy the workers' instrument of power is the union. There the worker participates in decisions, especially in cases of confrontation. The fact that the union must be taken into account by the businessman means that it has regulation powers in decisions concerning remuneration as well as non-economic concerns. The worker is not subject to the arbitrary decision of the businessman. The union is the instrument the workers can count on in the capitalist economy, and not other instruments of power, which tend to weaken workers, which do not substantially alter the capitalist character of the enterprise, and which on the contrary can only bring about weakness in the transformations of the whole economy and the political life of the country.
In the state realm, on the other hand, the situation varies fundamentally. There, an incorporation of the workers should take place in proportion to the disappearance of class contradictions. But this does not clarify the problem of the real form of incorporation that we will propose here. In Chile, two divergent positions exist concerning this issue: the idea of central democratic planning, and the forms of co-operative management or workers' enterprises, which some call the model of self-management, referring in a distorted way to the Yugoslav case.
We believe that the model of workers' enterprises or the forms of creating co-operatives are not appropriate for the monopolistic sector, nor as the principal model of economic activity. Self-management belongs to an intermediate degree of socialization, at the level of a work collective or global social forces, and not at the level of classes, which is conducive to creating permanent situations that approach the model of private enterprise. Socialization can only be realized in the measure that it reflects the decisions of all the workers. That means that the decisions of a central government should prevail over workers' collectives or individual workers.
Objective reality offers us some important elements on which to base this judgment. In an economy with a strong monopolistic concentration, it is absolutely impossible to think of turning over the monopolistic centers of decision making to workers' collectives. That would mean turning over such great relative power to those workers that, in the long run, they would become transformed in the dominant or oligarchic circles within the economy, to the detriment of the rest of the country's workers. Thus, for example, if copper is turned over to the co-operative decision making or self-management of the copper workers, we would be faced with a phenomenon in which a small sector of the country's workers would have a dominant participation in the decision making of an activity that affects, in a permanent and profound way, all the Chilean people. The copper -workers have something to say, they ought to be incorporated into decision making, but the participation of the Chilean state, of the government, must be dominant, since it represents all our workers. In this way, the copper industry can participate in national planning, with the result that our resources are used to benefit all Chileans.
The same situation can be found in the banks. It is impractical to think that the banking sector can be turned over to bank workers, organized into co-operatives, because that would mean turning over to a sector of workers something that interests and affects the whole worker population. The national monopolistic structure makes it necessary for sectors that exercise a dominant role in the whole economy to adopt a socialized form of decision making under centralized planning that does not exclude participation of workers but rather, on the contrary, integrates all the workers and not only those of the work collective. In this way, all workers, incorporated in the government, plan the allocation of those resources, and, on a lower level, there would also be preferential participation of the workers of the enterprise, incorporating them into shared decision making with the government but with the government decision always dominating in the last instance.
To insist on self-management as the principal solution to the incorporation of workers into decision making in the Chilean economy is an ideological insistence that has no foundation. . . . That insistence is no more than a search for a non-reactionary alternative in order to oppose the forms of centralized planning.
Nevertheless, we should not limit ourselves to denouncing this ideological alternative but rather try to explain it. We believe that it is logical for forms of self-management to be attractive—to the sectors with an essentially moral, fundamentally anti-scientific attitude of rejection toward the operation of capitalist forms, which constantly search for Utopian solutions and goals. . . . 
In summary, to the degree that the fundamental instrument of decision making on the level of the dominant, monopolistic sector of the economy, will be planned by the state, the important problem of incorporating the workers to power does not so much radiate around the enterprise—although there must also be participation there—but focuses rather on the state itself and its principal instruments by means of their organizations and parties. The incorporation into enterprise comes later, under the conditions already described, with a central criterion. Participation, but not on the dominant level. The participation of the state must be dominant, as the representative not of sectors of social classes but rather of the social forces as such.
The form in which this process will be constructed in practice is impossible to define at this moment, because it will become formulated as the reality dictates. We must not fall into the same error as those who developed successive co-operative or self-management forms, but rather create our own model.
The concrete experiences of interventions and expropriations that have come about, or those that will happen in the future as the program of the Popular Unity is completed, will bring errors and successes, and the forms that should be adopted, the criteria that must be corrected, the social and technical education that the workers must have, will come from that experience.
The task consists, therefore, of seeing that the interventions and expropriations do not become transformed into a mere transfer to the state, but that they remain a problem of pursuit and permanent analysis, of discussion with workers, of concrete understanding of their experiences, through which that bud of socialist society can be transformed into learning for the rest of the workers and into possibilities of success in our struggle to implant and construct socialism in Chile.
1. The Alessandri administration governed between 1958 and 1964.
2. This point is disputed by other Chilean analysts of economic power. See particularly Ricardo Lagos, La concentración del poder económico (Santiago, 1964).
3. See Chapter 21 for an analysis of this group.
4. Garretón continues discussing the operation of the Banco Hipotecario group in relation to the operation of the Chilean stock market.
5. The allusion is to the Christian Democrats.
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